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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-1764
___________
YAKOV G. DRABOVSKIY,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN OF THE FCI ALLENWOOD
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00383)
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 25, 2013
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 6, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM
In the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Yakov G.
Drabovskiy was convicted, after a jury trial, of twenty counts of violating 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(a)(1)(B) for failing to depart after having been ordered removed. United States v.
Drabovskiy, W.D. La. Crim. No. 2:09-cr-00146. On April 6, 2010, he was sentenced to

seventy-eight months in prison (with credit for time served since his arrest) and a term of
supervised release. Drabovskiy appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
While the appeal was pending, Drabovskiy, housed at the Federal Correctional
Institution at Allenwood, filed two habeas corpus petitions in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (M.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 4:10-cv-01830 & 4:10cv-02226). In the first, he challenged his conviction for failure to depart and explained
that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was “designed for QUICK liberation.” The District Court
construed the petition as filed under § 2241 and denied it without prejudice because
Drabovskiy had not exhausted his direct appeal and presented claims not appropriately
brought pursuant to § 2241 (the challenge, the District Court explained, should have been
initiated in the district of conviction as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). The District
Court also ruled that the challenge was premature insomuch as it challenged immigration
custody because Drabovskiy was not in immigration custody.
In the second petition, Drabovskiy again challenged his conviction. The District
Court ruled that the petition was a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) and that
the claims were still unexhausted (because the direct appeal then remained pending), still
misdirected (because they should have been brought in a § 2255 motion in the district of
conviction), and still premature as to any immigration custody issues.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Drabvoskiy’s
criminal case in June 2011. See United States v. Drabovskiy, 435 F. App’x 319 (5th Cir.
2

2011) (per curiam). It does not appear that Drabovskiy sought relief under § 2255 in the
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Instead, in February 2013,
Drabovskiy filed, in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, another
challenge to his conviction for failure to depart. He also argued that the writ of habeas
corpus must not be suspended.1
A Magistrate Judge recommended that Drabovskiy’s case be dismissed. The
Magistrate Judge described his filing as an unauthorized successive petition under
§ 2244(a) and a petition that was not properly brought under § 2241 because it needed to
be presented as a § 2255 motion in the district of conviction. The Magistrate Judge
further stated that to the extent that Drabovskiy sought to challenge any immigration
detention, any challenge to future immigration detention was premature where he was not
yet in the custody of immigration officials and any challenge to past detention was moot
where he had already been released from it. After Drabovskiy filed objections in which
he stated, among other things, that he “does not challenge this immigrational [sic]
problems in [his] petition,” the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation with a modification to not consider the immigration-custody issues.
The District Court dismissed the action without prejudice to Drabovskiy’s pursuit of the
other legal avenues described in the report. Drabovskiy then filed a motion to amend his
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In doing so, he contended that a suspension-of-the-writ claim “should not be confused
with 2241, 2254, or 2255 petitions.”
3

filing to add a claim about the indictment in his criminal case, which the District Court
denied.
Drabovskiy appeals. The parties were notified that this case was slated for
possible summary action. In response, Drabovskiy asks that we reverse the District
Court’s ruling and order the District Court to consider the merits of his case. He also
presents a “motion for the default and a default judgment,” on the basis that the appellee
has not filed any argument relating to this appeal, and a “motion for release pending
appeals.”
Our review of the District Court’s legal conclusions is plenary, and our
consideration of its factual findings is under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See
Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). We
review its exercises of discretion for abuse thereof. See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
The District Court properly determined that it was without jurisdiction to
considered Drabovskiy’s filing as a § 2241 motion. Drabovskiy cannot bring his claims
under § 2241, because a motion to challenge his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. However, the
District Court did not consider whether the filing was a § 2255 motion. Although
Drabovskiy asserts that his filing is some sort of habeas petition not covered by §§ 2241,
2254, or 2255, in substance, his filing is a § 2255 motion. See Lewis v. Att’y Gen. of the
U.S., 878 F.2d 714, 722 n.20 (3d Cir. 1989) (requiring that a pro se pleading be “judged
4

by its substance rather than according to its form or label”). He challenges the whole of
his criminal case, from the indictment to the jury instructions, claiming trial court error
and prosecutorial misconduct in between. Such a § 2255 motion, his first after his direct
appeal (where it appears no § 2255 motion has been considered on the merits), is
appropriately entertained only by the court that imposed his sentence. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a).
So that the court that imposed Drabovskiy’s sentence may consider his challenge
to it, we vacate the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P.
10.6. We remand with instructions for the District Court to transfer Drabovskiy’s § 2255
motion (ECF No. 1) and his proposed amendment (in his motion to amend, ECF No. 7) to
the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631 (“[T]he court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal
to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time
it was filed.”). Drabovskiy’s request that we reverse the District Court, his “motion for
the default and a default judgment,” and his “motion for release pending appeals” are
denied.
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